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BOOK REVIEWS
MANN'S

119

POSTMODERNISM

Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986).
Michael Mann has intentionally or unintentionally attempted to create a
postmodern method of interpreting world history. While Mann never
mentions the terms "postmodern," "poststructural," or "deconstruction,"
there are striking parallels between Mann's conceptions of history, society,
and power and the basic tenets of postmodernist theory. Mann's view of
history resembles what Michel Foucault (1972:3-17) describes as the
poststructuralist "epistemological mutation of history," in which the "project
of a total history," which seeks to explain the forms of world civilizations and
the processes that account for their rise and fall, is rejected in favor of a
"general history" of discontinuous series of events and the relationship
between them. Mann's rejection of the concept of society reflects what
Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984:14-18) describes as the consequence of the
"breaking u p of the grand Narratives" of the legitimation of knowledge—i.e.
the "dissolution of the social bond," or, the " 'atomization' of the social into
flexible networks of language games." And Mann's definition of power once
again echoes Foucault (1980:93), when the latter states that "power is not an
institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are
endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical
situation in a particular society." Power, for Foucault, is the "moving
substrate of force relations" which are manifest in all human interactions.
Power is the postmodern watchword; it is thought to be the only reality that
persists through the "play of signifiers" that give precarious form to the
world we know (Baudrillard, 1975:127). Mann shares the postmodern
obsession with power and, after deconstructing the concepts "history" and
"society," he demonstrates that power is the only thing real or tangible
enough to be a worthy object of scholarly inquiry.
The Deconstruction of History. Mann's project is to trace the historical
development of power. He writes of his book that "each chapter concerns
itself with the 'leading edge' of power, where the capacity to integrate
peoples and spaces into dominant configurations is most infrastructurally
developed" (1986:31). A civilizationist might expect such a study to trace how
the leading edge of power has shifted from one civilization to another
throughout history; but Mann's concern is with the development of power
a n d world h e g e m o n y within the presently most p o w e r f u l world
civilization—the West. Mann declares that "the most appropriate history is
that of the most powerful human society, modern Western civilization
(including the Soviet Union), whose history has been just about continuous
from the origins of Near Eastern civilization around 3000 B.C. to the present
day" (1986:31). T h u s "history" is deconstructed into "power."
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Mann does not explain why, in his judgement, "the most appropriate
history is that of the most powerful human society." This is simply stated as a
given. But why is it inappropriate, or less appropriate, to write the histories
of less powerful societies? Why they failed to attain global hegemony is surely
just as interesting a question as why the West succeeded in doing so. Beyond
this point, however, there is the claim advanced by some comparative
civilizations scholars that the history of each culture on the face of the earth
should be studied as a means of mapping the "irreversible directionalities of
development" (Nelson and Kavolis, 1973:13).
Furthermore, the notion that one can study only the history of "the most
powerful human society" in isolation from developments in other, less
powerful, parts of the world ignores the claim of Immanuel Wallerstein
(1976:229-239) that the only "real" unit of analysis for historical sociology is
the world-system. While Wallerstein's study of the hegemony of the
world-system is flawed because he focuses almost exclusively on the growth
of economic power, which Mann avoids by postulating the interplay of four
sources of social power throughout history, Wallerstein does rightly point
out that states can be only relatively strong or weak—i.e. in relation to each
other. It seems reasonable to believe that we cannot know in what sense
Western civilization is strong unless we also know in what sense other
civilizations are weak.
Every world historian knows that the West was not always at the pinnacle
of world power. In fact, the period covered in the first volume of Mann's
work, i.e. from the "beginning" to A.D. 1760, is generally recognized as a
time during which the West did not even emerge as a competitor for world
power until the sixteenth century. T h e clear dominance by the West over the
rest of the world was not established until after 1760, at the beginning of the
industrial revolution. This pattern of history is described by William McNeill
(1963), although McNeill does not treat the rise of Near Eastern civilization
as part of the development of the West—the West, in his narration, starts out
as a peripheral civilization in Greece (from 1700-500 B.C.), gradually
emerging to compete for power with other cultures (McNeill, 1963:167-249).
Assuming history to be deconstructed to power, then, the question I raise
is whether it is appropriate for a history of power to focus only on the history
of the currently dominant world civilization, or whether it would be more
appropriate, and honest, to explore, as does McNeill, how the center of
global power has shifted throughout history from one region to another,
thereby giving, for example, Islamic, Indian, and Chinese civilizations a role
in world history.
And is the West truly so dominant as Mann thinks? Simply put, it is
impossible for me to believe that any one culture can be supreme in each of
Mann's four types of social ideological, economic, military, and political
power for any sustained length of time. Certainly, Western civilization has
not been the world's most powerful ideological, economic, military, and
political force throughout all of world history; and it is difficult to believe that
the West dominates the world in each of these aspects today. Indeed, by what
absolute criteria can anyone compare the relative strengths and weaknesses
of ideological, economic, military, and political power between different
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cultures? How can one say whether Marxism is ideologically stronger than
liberal democracy, or that either of these is "stronger" than Christianity,
Islam, or Buddhism? In what sense is the West today economically
"stronger" than Japan? If any country that possesses nuclear weapons has
the potential to destroy the world, is the West militarily "stronger" than
China? Finally, should one judge the "strength" of a political system on the
basis of its stability, or of its dynamism? Japan has had about the world's
longest unbroken succession of emperors; India has perhaps survived the
largest number of external invasions. Which has the stronger political
system, Japan, India, or the West?
Consequently, in his shunning of other civilizations besides the West,
Mann risks being accused of ethnocentrism, even though Mann does not
particularly like the "fact" that the West reigns supreme, and believes that he
is simply describing an objective state of affairs. It is, however, true that,
unlike Hegel, Mann denies that it was in any sense inevitable that the West
rise to world hegemony. Regarding the supremacy of Western culture,
Mann says that "there has been nothing 'necessary' about it—it just
happened that way. . ."(Mann, 1986:31). This is the manifestation of Mann's
postmodern conception of world history, which he claims to have derived
from Ernest Gellner's notion of "neo-episodic" social development. This,
according to Mann, entails the view that "fundamental social change occurs,
and human capacities are enhanced, through a number of 'episodes' of
major structural transformation" (Mann, 1986:3). It is important to note
that, for Mann, these episodes are not part of any kind of developmental
historical process. Mann claims to believe that history develops but that there
is no discernible pattern to this development. "History," to Mann, "seems just
one damned thing after another" (1986:532).
The Deconstruction of Society. "Societies," says Mann, "are not unitary. They
are not social systems (closed or open); they are not totalities" (1986:1-2).
Mann points out that the etymology of the word "society" can be traced to the
Latin term "societas" which signified a non-Roman ally willing to follow
Rome into battle. This definition, according to Mann, denoted an
asymmetrical alliance, a "society" comprised of "a loose confederation of
stratified allies" (1986; 14). Mann claims that "the most frequent usage of the
term 'society' is loose and flexible, indicating any stable human group"
(1986:13). He purposely rejects the more conventional usage of the term
"society," i.e. as a unitary social system, by sociologists from Comte, to
Durkheim, to Parsons; and he maintains that "of the major theorists, only
Weber showed a wariness of this approach and only Parsons has confronted
it explicitly" (1986-13). Mann's definition of society, then, is presented as a
slight modification of Parsons' definition of society as "a type of social system,
in any universe of social systems which attains the highest level of
self-sufficiency as a system in relation to its environment" (Parsons, 1966:9).
"By dropping the excessive use of the word 'systems' while preserving
Parsons' essential meaning," Mann believes, "we can arrive at a better
definition: A society is a network of social interaction at the boundaries of
which is a certain level of interaction cleavage between it and its
environment" (1986:13).
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I raise only two of many possible objections to this procedure. First, I do
not see how it is possible to drop Parsons' use of the term "system" without
also dropping Parsons, since his life project was to show how society can
fruitfully be thought of as a system. Second, it is quite wrong to state thaton/y
Parsons has explicitly confronted the problem of the concept of a unitary
social system. T o the best of my knowledge, it was Georg Simmel who did the
most work towards demonstrating that society is not a unitary system but a
network of social interaction (1950:3-25). Mann's complete neglect of
Simmel throughout his work is problematic, especially since Simmel's ideas
about the nature of society as networks of social interaction, the functionality
of conflict, and the social significance of marginal people are directly
relevant to many of Mann's major themes.
Perhaps the primary unresolved paradox in Mann's book concerns his
insistence, on the one hand, that society is nothing but a loose network of
social interaction, and, on the other hand, that the rise and persistence of
civilizations have entailed an oppressive a m o u n t of what he calls "social
caging," since caging seems to serve as a vehicle for reintroducing system and
process to the deconstructed analysis. Starting with Renfrew's definition of
civilization as "insulation from nature," Mann relates that there were two
main stimuli for the emergence of civilizations. T h e initial thrust towards
civilization was the development of alluvial and irrigation forms of
agriculture, developed in response to environmental constraints, which, as
Mann puts it, closed the "escape route" for those who became agriculturalists
(the earliest being those who, around 4000 B.C., settled in the valley between
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and along the alluvial shores of the Nile
river). They, according to Mann, "unlike those in the rest of the globe, were
constrained to accept civilization, social stratification, and the state. They
were trapped into particular social and territorial relationships, forcing them
to intensify those relationships rather than evade them" (1986:74-75). This
process is r e f e r r e d to by Mann as "environmental circumscription"
(1986:75). Here, I think, Mann is influenced by McNeill's romantic depiction
of ancient, free-spirited, nomad, pastoralists who repudiated crop tillage as
"unworthy of free men" (1963:16).
T h e second factor contributing to the emergence of the first civilizations
that Mann discusses has to do with the fact that they were situated in
geographical regions of great ecological contrasts, say, between the alluvial
"core" and the hinterland "periphery" (1986:76). "Such contrasts," writes
Mann, "seem the recipe for the emergence of civilizations" (1986:81). In
Mann's view, the interaction between alluvium and hinterlands was crucial
for the development of further "social caging" within the core—that is, the
existence, for the core, of an "other" served to solidify its boundaries
(1986:77). At the same time, the impetus from the core led outward to the
less settled regions, bringing them within the fold of civilization (1986:92-93).
These peripheral areas turn out, for Mann, to be the key to the progression
of world history because they introduce innovations in the core's sources of
social power that eventually allow the periphery to dominate the core and
then become a core itself in a dialectical process Mann terms "interstitial
emergence" (1986:161-167) or "interstitial surprise" (1986:533-541). T h e
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peoples who have lived on the margins of civilization, referred to by Mann as
the "Marcher lords," then, have been the bearers of the "world soul" of
history (1986:130-178). In the words of Mann, "the world-historical process
acquires their migratory legs" (1986:539). This, despite Mann's earlier
insistence that no discernible process is evident throughout the course of
world history.
Power. Mann's deconstruction of the concept of society is necessary in
order for him to argue that power is what is ultimately "primary" or
"determining" in human interactions (1986:2). This is the major point Mann
seeks to make in his book, that "societies are constituted of multiple
overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power" (1986:1).
Mann proceeds to delineate the four sources of social power which combine
to form his IEMP model of organized power (1986:2-3). But, despite the fact
that the assertion of four sources of social power seems to imply a functional
relationship between them, Mann attempts to avoid what Bryan T u r n e r
(1986) has called the "inescapability" of functionalism by denying outright
that there is any kind of normative basis for social order. Society, for Mann is
nothing but the interplay of ideological, economic, military, and political
power.
By denying the normative basis of social order, Mann implicitly rejects the
crux of Durkheim's and Parsons' work, and falls back on a crude utilitarian
theory of maximizing man. "Human beings," he remarks, "are restless,
purposive, and rational, striving to increase their enjoyment of the good
things of life and capable of choosing and pursuing appropriate means to do
so" (1986:4). This premise leads him, ironically, to borrow Parsons' phrasing
of power as "a 'generalized means" for attaining whatever goals one wants"
(1968:263). I say this is ironic because the main purpose of Parsons' book, The
Structure of Social Action, was to address the "Hobbesian problem of order,"
i.e. how social order could be maintained when each individual pursues his
own ends (1968:89-94). While Parsons wrote that "the ultimate ends of
different chains [of means-end relationships] cannot be related to each other
at random but must to a significant extent constitute a coherent system"
(1968:231), Mann ignores the issue of the conflict of ultimate ends
altogether. T h e Hobbesian problem of order does not exist for him because
he does not believe that society is comprised by normative boundaries.
Mann, when he talks about society, mentions only environmental
Circumscription, which has been discussed, and "compulsory cooperation,"
which is a term borrowed from Herbert Spencer referring to military
dictatorship. Compulsory cooperation is what Mann claims held together
the first "empires of domination," i.e. the Akkadian, the Assyrian, and the
Roman (1986;146-155), although he does observe that during times of
"ideological transcendence" a kind of "normative pacification" of social
unrest was occasionally possible in history [1986:301-340]. Mann makes a
special effort to demonstrate the beneficence, or at least the functionality, of
compulsory cooperation (1986:148-152), and I might speculate that he does
so in order to make less frightening the only alternative he really offers to the
Hobbesian "war of all against all"—i.e. the Leviathan.
Mann offers us a history of the sources of social power that denies its own
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possibility. How can power develop if there is no history? In what does social
power subsist if there is no society? How can there be any sources of power
when there is nothing which potentially cannot serve as a source of power,
i.e. as a means to some end? But if The Sources of Social Power is not a history,
nor a sociology, nor a theory of power, then what is it? It is precisely this
problem of identity that is raised by the condition of postmodernity, and
which should serve as the starting point for any serious postmodernist text.
Otherwise, writing becomes a mere game of charades in which words can
mean anything and nothing.
Jeffrey A. Shad, Jr.
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This book is published in a Classics of Anthropology series. Morgan
(1818-1881), a lawyer by profession, acquired a student interest in the Indian
culture of the Iroquois. That growing social-political interest in ethnology
paralleled a relatively brief but highly successful career in law. He was able to
retire with a m o d e s t f o r t u n e a n d devote his life ( f r o m 1856) to
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